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Abstract: It is fashionable to claim ‘the end of history’. As classical war seems to be over, 
many scholars – particularly Alexandre Kojève – argue that we currently face ‘the end of 
international relations’. This article considers the opposite, that is to say how we are now 
at the real beginning of international relations, and even of ‘intersocial relations’, whereby 
social actors and individuals are more and more involved. Such an analysis is also a way of 
reinterpreting the dawn of IR, with its internal debates and tensions as well as their present 
transformations. The article questions the traditional typology of IR theories, and points out 
correlations between theoretical challenges and changes or evolutions of history. It is also a 
way for shedding light on what could be considered, in such a chaos, the French approach of 
International Relations. Is it only a ‘French touch’ or the basis of a new paradigm?
Keywords: IR theory, end of history, sociology of IR, power politics
As a philosopher, as well as a lawyer and a Franco-Russian diplomat, Alexandre Ko-
jève  (1902–1968) perceived recent IR transformations as the early signs of an end 
of History .1 In a very shared vision, he postulated that IR resulted from a age-old ri-
valry among states, making this argument the corner-stone of all possible conceptual 
edifices. Here is probably the basic misunderstanding of our discipline which was 
too promptly defined, in Hobbes’ wake, as a science of the war exclusively based on 
power politics. If globalisation now challenges state sovereignty, results in an ever 
denser network of international laws, transforms inter-state wars into intra-state con-
flicts, erases borderlines, then Kojève is definitely arguing correctly.
The spectre of a world society is thus properly perceived by Kojève as the real 
beginning of the end of History. Such a fear is however rooted in a vision which 
limits international politics to power politics shaped by a permanent confrontation 
among potential enemies. It opens up the perpetuation of IR as an inter-state set of 
relations. It provides a worldwide dimension to the specific European adventure that 
is a fragmentation of states and perpetual competition between them. Such a reduc-
tion dramatically structures the discipline, blinds the view of scholars and observers 
while paralysing actors and present policy-makers. What if this end of traditional IR, 
for erstwhile diplomats and soldiers was in fact the beginning of a new history? What 
*  This is a shortened version of Bertrand Badie, Quand l’histoire commence, published in French by CNRS editions 
in 2013. ISBN 2196-6923 (print version) and 2196-7415 (online version)
1  Alexandre Kojève, Introduction à la lecture de Hegel (Paris: Gallimard, 1947) ;  Alexandre Kojève,  Esquisse 
d’une phénoménologie du droit (Paris: Gallimard, 1981).
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if a new history was starting by including not only rival states, but also struggling or 
cooperating social actors and ‘compenetrated’ societies? What if ‘intersocial’ rela-
tions were taking the place of international relations?
A CHAOTIC DAWN
International politics has obviously a long history, but was belatedly built up as an 
academic discipline. Wars have then played a major role. For example, the first chair 
in IR was created at Aberyswith just after the First World War, but the new science 
was really organised just after the Second World War. This last trauma contributed to 
shaping it as a science of war and power. Without such a disaster, it could have been 
less oriented to war. Without US hegemony constructed during the war, it could have 
been conceived differently, probably as less American but more universal.
In its time, the Versailles Peace of 1919 paved another way which was leading to 
a science much more oriented to peace studies. The academic rallying cry was ‘never 
again’, in line with the League of Nations which was created at the same time. Schol-
ars were then prompt to follow Norman Angell who published The Great Illusion 
just before 1914 in denouncing war as out of touch and old fashioned.2 Intellectuals 
who were appointed by the US State Department and the British Foreign Office to 
participate in peace negotiations were known as pacifists, like Keynes, Zimmern or 
Toynbee.3
Institutes were promptly created in the USA and the UK for promoting inter-
national cooperation, more than working on war. The Royal Institute of International 
Affairs (1920) had to deal with the “different points of view of peoples and nations”. 
The American Institute of International Affairs (1920) merged with the Council on For-
eign Relations to work on a better understanding of international issues and on a 
more relevant foreign policy. The League of Nations boosted the International Studies 
Conferences which aimed to educate public opinion in various fields, like ‘states in 
economic life’, ‘collective security’, ‘peaceful change’ or ‘economic policies and 
world peace’.
Obviously, the die was not cast and all the ways were still open to a very young 
and uncertain science. Hobbes seemed to be as far away as the next war was too. For 
this reason, the starry-eyed dreamers were probably the first to be blamed in 1945 
after a war which entailed a pendulum swing. From a Kantian science, IR moved 
to a much more Hobbesian position. Without the two wars, IR studies would have 
certainly followed another path and probably with another form as well as another 
substance.
The Cold War was an excellent training field for Hobbesian paradigms with a 
polarised world, made of two rival camps, bringing antagonistic ideologies, and 
each able to destroy the other. The USSR and USA looked just like the gladiators 
described in the Leviathan. When looking back, the first IR science appeared as ide-
2 Norman Angell, The Great Illusion (New York: Knickerbocker Press, 1913).
3  Alfred Zimmern, The League of Nations, and the Rule of Law (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1936). Sir Alfred Zim-
mern (1879–1957) was a well-known historian and political scientist. He is considered as one of the founding 
fathers of the League of Nations and UNESCO. Questioning realism, he was regarded as an idealist among the 
IR scholars.
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alist, while the new one claimed to be realist: the great transformation was on. The 
USA became naturally the motherland of this new science which could not but make 
power its fetish: Weber and Hobbes were back!
Realism has then been commonly said to be the dominating theory. But is it 
really a theory or, more exactly, a posture? A theory would have provided a global 
explanation of the international arena, including all its parameters, actors, issues 
and histories, while realism is restricted to offering a narrative on rivalries among 
potentially warlike states. In such a perspective, international politics is purely syn-
onymous with power politics and power should be considered without any limits 
or constraints. Moreover, power used outside the state is then quite different from 
power inside, and domestic politics as well as ethics have nothing to do with IR, as 
it was argued by Morgenthau.4 What we get through this paradigm is a clear vision 
of international politics during the Cold War. We are, however, deprived of the main 
instruments for investigating the present global world arena.
Nevertheless, some nuances have to be made. Realism distrusts ethics when it 
thwarts power, but is still strongly bound to its moral roots and especially to Ameri-
can messianism. One of its founding fathers, Reinhold Niebuhr, was deeply marked 
by Protestant theology and its norms. US power did not claim to intervene without 
any moral concerns 5 .It aimed to contain Soviet military power and to block the 
‘Empire of evil’. Power is also reputed to have a virtuous orientation, and Hobbes is 
partially mistaken since not all the gladiators look the same. As a matter of fact, real-
ism remains dependent on political context. It moved to neo-realism during the sev-
enties when the Cold War became organised, with détente the order of the day, and 
a new bipolar order had to be considered. It generated a controversy between ‘of-
fensive’ and ‘defensive’ realism when American hegemony was questioned and US 
foreign policy was torn between Carter’s compromises and Reagan’s inflexibility.
We can clearly glimpse the role of ideology no matter how blinded it was by 
realism. There was even a first as IR was never before so shaped by the clash of two 
ideologies which fed upon one another, to the extent of organising state rivalry as 
the main game. This ‘main game’ principle which is now clearly over is precisely 
the corner-stone of realist posture which makes it now out of fashion. But, even 
during this ‘golden age’, was this vision shared everywhere around the world? The 
overwhelming majority of books published in the discipline came from the USA, so 
much so that no one there had regard for other sources. The main conventions held 
in the field were organised by the ISA (International Studies Association) which was 
founded in the US in 1959, with its head office successively in Colorado, Minnesota, 
South Carolina and then Arizona. It brings together more than 5000 panellists every 
year, in a North American city, always with English as its working language. It also 
has book exhibitions displaying works written in English, while papers almost ex-
clusively quote references in the same language.
In Europe, international studies are clearly humble and mainly constituted by 
British works. In the United Kingdom, scholars were building on a tradition inau-
gurated before the Second World War.  The British International Studies Association 
extended the former ‘Bailey conferences’ thus distancing itself from the US partner. 
The ‘English school’, later dominated by the work of Martin Wight (1913-1972) and 
4 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, (New York: Knopf 1964 (1948).  
5 Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society (New York: Scribner’s, 1947).
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Hedley Bull (1932-1985), was built up in the footsteps of Kant and Grotius, even 
Durkheim and rather far from a Hobbesian vision. By stressing the role of solidarity, 
cooperation and ‘international society’, it was closer to the Continent rather than to 
US perspectives. 6
Indeed, there is no ‘Anglo-Saxon’ science of international relations, as the UK 
and USA did not experience the Second World War in the same manner. If the latter 
could consider power as the source of its new hegemony, the former is still in the her-
itage of an old European history made of compromise and confrontation by which 
the United Kingdom was progressively shaped. The first is engaged in a messianic 
function, while the second places itself in a age-old international life of which it has 
always been one of the major actors.
The same is true on the Continent, and particularly in France, through the Dur-
kheimian solidarist tradition, updated in international politics by the likes of Léon 
Bourgeois, Aristide Briand or Albert Thomas. As a sociologist, Durkheim empha-
sised integration in societies, mainly for lowering the intensity of conflicts and avoid-
ing a class struggle. Globalisation is in line with this vision, as it requires a minimum 
of international integration. For this reason, Léon Bourgeois had an element of fore-
sight when he argued, in 1907, that social issues as well as public opinion will play 
a more and more important role in international relations, and will be progressively 
substituted for military rivalry among states.7 This vision boosted the League of 
Nations and opened a parallel way to multilateralism. Besides liberal institutional-
ism initiated by President Woodrow Wilson, consideration was given to the socio-
logical roots and functions of international organisations. Weber lost his monopoly 
and  Durkheimian integration became meaningful as an IR concept. Investigating a 
global order implied a detour by the classical heritage of the great sociological theo-
ries. However this vision was kept out of the American science for a long time. The 
word ‘solidarity’ is still ignored and has never been current among US IR scholars.
The German political scientist Harald Müller promoted a closely related vision 
when he compared the European and American traditions.8 Europe is shown as plural 
and fragmented, focusing on particular histories, whereas the USA aims at a more 
global and universal vision. For this reason, American science gives priority to ra-
tionality, statistics and quantitative approaches. Quite the reverse is the case in Eu-
rope. Scholars keep their distance from rational choice and prefer approaches which 
are more connected with history or anthropology which shed light on the plurality of 
values and cultures. The Old Continent is moving to a more transdisciplinary con-
ception of IR which clearly challenges a monolithic realism.
However, the American supremacy in IR studies was so strong that no real con-
troversies took place over several decades, and the theoretical debate was never re-
ally embarked upon. Had it been, the evolution of the discipline would have certainly 
been different. The absence of real debate would explain the false sense of certainty 
and deceptive universalism which affect the mainstream of our discipline. A stronger 
participation of European social sciences as well as a real mobilisation of research 
6  Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics (London: Macmillan,1977); Emile 
Durkheim, The Division of Labour in Society (New York: Free Press, 1984 [1893]; Hugo Grotius, Du droit 
de la guerre et de la paix (Paris: PUF,1999); Martin Wight, Systems of States, (Leicester: Leicester University 
Press, 1977); Martin Wight, International Theory: The Three Traditions (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 
1991).
7  Léon Bourgeois, Pour la Société des Nations (Paris, Fasquelle, 1910).
8  Harald Müller, ‘Are Distinct IR Reflected in Diverging Security Policies?’ multig, Groningen, (October 2007) 
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coming from Asia, Africa or Latin America would certainly have given a different 
shape to IR theory which would have been richer, more flexible and more universal.
The real configuration of IR theory as it emerged has actually reduced History 
to one history and universality to one culture. This unfortunate simplification was 
acceptable during the Cold War, as it was closely inspired by realist rules of game. It 
becomes unacceptable in the new context of globalisation. Realism can hardly take 
into account decolonisation and the final victory of the weakest gladiators. It is still 
hampered by the failing universalisation of state rationality in a globalised world. 
It fails to understand new international conflicts in their complexities9 and does not 
succeed in interpreting correctly cultural pluralism in the international arena, save 
for mobilising an highly controversial concept – the ‘clash of civilizations.’  This 
lack of anthropological vision led directly to developmentalist naiveties, cultural es-
sentialism and a very conservative vision of new international conflicts.
The main features of globalisation are poorly visible and weakly construed 
through realist constructions. Inclusiveness is poorly compatible with the realist nar-
rative. Non-state actors cannot be spotted except as very marginal ones while the 
increasing role of a mass communication which challenges sovereignties and ter-
ritories up to classical geopolitics is underrated. 
Inclusiveness questions the old club diplomacy and outdates the Vienna Con-
gress which, for a long time, served Western diplomacy.  It weakens the concept of 
polarity as well as the postulate of an ordered international system. Is then China 
compatible with Hobbesian standards? In its several thousand year history, the Chi-
nese empire has never really experienced a gladiator game in which it would have 
been opposed to equivalent Powers, as European states were. Conquest was lim-
ited to its own margins and has never resulted in long distance projections. As the 
‘Middle Empire’, it developed a sense of otherness which is quite different from 
that which we find among Western countries. It ignores the others rather than trying 
to convert them to its own vision. It has never been attracted by universalism and 
never brought a messianic vision of international action, except as it was briefly and 
superficially captured by Marxism which, significantly, was imported from Europe! 
The present debate on China in the new global world is largely pre-empted by the 
uncertain compatibility between Chinese history and the realist historical narrative.
The earlier entrance of Japan into globalisation gave rise to the same scepticism. 
‘Globalization from below’, as described by Jeremy Brecher,10 reveals the social 
roots of a transformation which took place in the Archipelago after the Second World 
War and which  was poorly controlled by political actors. It also underlines the role 
of transnational social networks binding Japanese society to other countries. Sociol-
ogy and anthropology need then to be used in preference to classical geopolitics for 
reaching a convincing explanation of this development. The same would be true of 
the forms of ‘new regionalism’ promoted in Asia through ‘natural economic terri-
tory’ 11 which challenge the classical territorial order beyond sovereign states.
A similar argument could also be applied to rising Powers, especially India and 
Brazil which cannot be compared with European history, as well as Arab or African 
countries. The Arab Spring confirms the specific historicity of the region and the 
 9 Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999).
10  Jeremy Brecher, Tim Costillo, Brendan Smith (eds.), Globalization  from Below: the Power of Solidarity (Cam-
bridge: South End Press, 2000).
11 Robert Scalapino, ‘The United States and Asia: Future Prospects’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 5 (1991) 
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inadequacy of European paradigms for taking it into account. An anthropological 
investment is needed for interpreting their politics, to ferret out many dangerous 
common phrases like ‘African tribalism’ or ‘Arab fundamentalism’.  While a realist 
geopolitics inclines to reify such categories, a sociological analysis takes them as 
markers of a failed international social integration. When a realist analysis brings 
these features back to the norms of a classical inter-state competition it gives an 
incorrect vision of these conflicts and creates illusions on the way to deal with and 
solve them. Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Congo, along with Vietnam, cannot be re-
duced to a simple competition of state Powers, nor can these conflicts be compared 
with the Thirty Years War.
IN SEARCH OF ALTERNATIVE MODELS
This realist stubbornness has to be explained. Is it due to a lack of theoretical choice, 
or a too limited debate inside the discipline? Controversies were not absent, but not 
really clear, and have never toppled the realist hegemony. Marxism could have been 
a challenge, but appeared, in the Cold War context, as an ideological rival rather 
than a scientific competitor. Beyond it, three other debates suggest the reshaping of 
IR and give rise to a possible new configuration to the academic field. The first one 
is certainly the oldest. It dates back to the 17th century when it opposed Hobbes to 
Grotius. The second one has its roots in the 19th century when a science of power 
was opposed to a science of integration. The last one took place in the USA when 
realism had to meet behaviourism. All of them could have been very sharp, but they 
were actually skated over or at least ambiguous. When they became more radical, 
they resulted precisely in the myth of the end of History.
A strong debate could have structured the discipline of IR by opposing two tra-
ditions, one coming from Hobbes and the dominant vision, the other from Grotius. 
Should the latter have been the winner, IR studies would have been more promptly 
oriented to transnational relations, and peace studies would have probably provided 
a vision of a less belligerent world as is required by commerce. It is probably why 
princes and decision-makers did not really trust the famous Dutch lawyer during 
the state-building time when war-making reinforced state-making and contained the 
pressure for democracy. They could not but observe that his references to natural 
law limited their room for free political and military manoeuvres. His liberal heirs 
turned out to be timorous and moderate. They were not committed to all the aspects 
of Grotius’ work. Instead of being inspired by the conclusions of his major book, 
and notably his exhortations to ‘good faith and peace’ in diplomacy, they preferred 
to remember his praise of competition which resulted in their mind in an apology 
for a free market. They pointed to his references to ‘just war’ without taking into ac-
count what Grotius wrote on ‘dubious causes’ which prefigured so many subsequent 
military interventions.12
For these reasons, liberalism has never been a strong challenge to realism. It 
was successively incarnated and reincarnated into secularism, enlightenment, free 
market, property, individualism and democracy. Unstable in its nature, it appears as 
12  Hugo Grotius, Du droit de la guerre et de la paix (Paris: PUF, 1999).
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a chameleon which nevertheless is unable to contain the realist credo. It can hardly 
be situated in the IR theory debate and cannot be considered as homogeneous nor as 
a clear retort to realism. Richard Beardsworth pointed out that it was alternately lib-
ertarian, neo-liberal, social democrat, republican, even radical. As such, it has been 
borrowed or captured by each of these trends.13 Hobbes was thus considered as a 
liberal when he supported a free competition among states even though he distrusted 
individual liberties. Locke was considered as such when he argued that the inde-
pendence of states is a collective liberty as well as that territorial integrity should be 
in the line of a collective conception of the property right. China would be in perfect 
accordance with such a Lockian vision!
Referring to liberalism, Stuart Mill was mainly anti-interventionist,14 while 
Cobden was strongly against any kind of intervention, as it denies liberty. French 
Girondins were pro-intervention on behalf of a liberal credo, as are contemporary 
neocons, as they consider intervention as an instrument of emancipation and liberty. 
Bentham had a finely-shaded opinion, whereas Canning, the liberal foreign minister, 
considered it favourably when it suited his own policy!  Some of the liberals were 
militantly in favour of an increasing role for institutions in international govern-
ance, especially Woodrow Wilson who claimed to contain war and instability by 
promoting international institutions and multilateralism. However neocons struggled 
against international organisations by using liberal arguments, while the ultra-liberal 
Ronald Reagan or Margaret Thatcher considered that international institutions did 
not have any role in the international game.
In such a confusion, liberalism and realism alternately supported and faced each 
other, as if the original opposition between Grotius and Hobbes had faded. Actually, 
debates reacted to a political context much more than to a theoretical controversy. 
Confrontations arose about the use of multilateralism, the opportunity for foreign 
intervention or the status of US hegemony. In spite of its strong visibility, the ‘neo-
neo controversy’, opposing the contemporary derivations of both realism and liber-
alism during the eighties, mirrored political research on the best way for keeping or 
restoring American leadership after the defeat in Vietnam which challenged US hard 
power for the first time. As they kept far from a real theoretical debate, both of them 
even tended towards the same conclusions. If liberalism admits the relevance of 
non-state actors in the international arena, it does not question the primordial role of 
the state. Although it claims the central role of inter-state conflicts, realism opts for a 
rational choice analysis which makes the state like a rational firm and then joins up 
with the liberal mainstream. Like realism, liberalism fell through its attempts to set 
itself up as a global theory of international relations. It only amended the Hobbesian 
discourse by stressing a very flexible and blurred vision of what liberty should be on 
the international arena. However, both of them were reluctant to become aware of 
anthropology, history, social structures and transnational solidarities, by sticking to a 
strictly monodisciplinary vision of international relations.
These ignored aspects could have been highlighted in Europe at the end of the 
19th century when the Old Continent was strongly affected by the class struggle at 
the domestic level. Actors and scholars came then to value social integration and 
solidarity as a necessary orientation of domestic policies. Emile Durkheim opposed 
13 Richard Beardsworth, Comspolitanism and International Relations Theory (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011).
14  Stuart Mill, ‘A Few Words on Nonintervention’, in G. Himmelfarb (ed.), Essays on Politics and Culture 
(Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1973).
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the concept of social integration to the Weberian concept of power.  Politics was no 
more considered through domestic hard power but through its social substratum. 
Even if Durkheim never extended his interpretation to international politics, some 
of his followers used and mobilised his postulates for promoting a new vision of 
international life along these lines. The initiative came more from politicians, like 
Léon Bourgeois, Albert Thomas or Aristide Briand and was hardly passed on to so-
cial sciences. This new direction strongly affected the League of Nations, the ILO, 
the Briand-Kellog Pact or Locarno. Competition among states was denounced as the 
main cause of the global ‘European weakness’. When war is considered as a neces-
sary evil, Bourgeois objects that it is a “barbarian theory”: Hobbes is far away and 
the conclusion goes to a needed introduction of a real sociological perspective.15
Peace is then perceived in a positive way and must be set up and managed 
through law, and particularly the rights of peoples. Peace is therefore defined as the 
corner-stone of international politics, while its main motor has to be located in the 
respective societies. Bourgeois claims that peoples were formerly isolated by state 
sovereignty and are more and more inclined to a mutual solidarity since sovereignty 
is then only ‘relative’. Conflicts are now considered in their social origins to which 
they are more due than to political and military competition. The French lawyer 
Georges Scelle thus considers that states are more and more ‘compenetrated’. 16 In-
ternational politics is hereafter at the confluence of law, political science, sociology, 
economics and history.
This embryonic vision of a new science was however marginal. It was never 
used during the Cold War with which it was hardly in tune. This was the case even 
in France, where Raymond Aron had a clear preference for realism and Max Weber 
while he severely questioned the Durkheimian heritage.17 Only a very few scholars 
in the discipline turned to sociology, the notable exceptions including David Mitra-
ny, John Burton or Norbert Elias, even if the latter observes that civilisation affects 
international politics only at its margins.
While it was constituted as a science in USA, IR had to define itself in relation 
to other social sciences which grew up in the American universities during the six-
ties and the seventies. Such a confrontation could have been the third one which 
would have contributed to the evolution of the discipline. It was, however, marginal 
and moderate. IR was clearly closed and relatively impervious to influences com-
ing from political science. Obviously, behaviouralism introduced new and useful 
perspectives, especially in foreign policy analysis, stressing the role of affect, mis-
perception or prejudice in the decision-making process. However, behaviouralism 
did not succeed in overcoming the rational choice illusion in the international field 
as it did in the domestic sphere. Standing alone and outside, IR did not benefit from 
the main stimulating controversies which took place in political science, neither on 
the state, nor on power (this debate occurred mainly in the UK with Susan Strange 
or in Canada with Robert Cox), while the controversy around the concept of non-
decision could have been fruitful in international studies. Nothing convincing can 
have been found in IR on culture and politics, but a very simplified and provocative 
hypothesis on the ‘clash of civilisations’ which totally ignores Geertz’ contribution 
15 Léon Bourgeois, op. cit.
16 Georges Scelle, Précis de droit des gens  (Paris: Sirey, 1932).
17 Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations (New York: Doubleday, 1966 [1962]).
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to anthropology and political science.18 The strong separation between the domestic 
and the international kept the discipline away from the research on political behav-
iour, mobilisation and social movements, at least up to Rosenau’s works, and more 
recent research on transnational social movements.19
Scholars definitely exchanged very little across the lines which separated IR 
from the other social sciences. International studies had to pay grievously for getting 
and keeping an abusive status of exception. Blocked in a ghetto, IR was condemned 
to a kind of rigid conservatism. It was as though an international fact was so very 
different from other facts that it had to be kept away from all improvements and 
benefits found elsewhere.
THE BREAKING POINT 
That is why changes could not come other than from a drastic change in the context. 
Will we breath indefinitely the air of 1947? Are the minor amendments from all the 
‘neos’ sufficient? The Cold War sequence is not eternal, however much this idea may 
hurt the major part of the academic (even political) community. Even polarity which 
was so lately accepted 20 is no more lasting, its collapse contributed to questioning 
the conceptual edifice. However this founding order could not last, as it arose from 
very exceptional, even hazardous circumstances – the advent of nuclear weapons, 
the defeat of nazism and the victory of two rising super Powers, a paroxysmal ideo-
logical confrontation, a colonial order which kept two thirds of the planet out of 
the system, and a global economic reconstruction. All these features obviously did 
not disappear. The break was not sharp nor absolute and we are not confronted by a 
strong paradigmatic revolution. Changes are too drastic for explanation through the 
interpretative capacity of classical theory, but not drastic enough for prompting the 
epistemic community to change its conceptual background.
Actually, the conceptual edifice vacillated as soon as sovereignty weakened. As 
an ‘organised hypocrisy’,21 sovereignty was the corner-stone of the Westphalian sys-
tem. It helped to define the state, to justify their competition, to validate the founding 
distinction between inside and outside, and even to make war meaningful. As a fic-
tion, it created legitimacy and provided coherence in the international order. When 
did such a mechanism break down? Probably when sovereignty lost its meaning 
and when solidarity got into the international arena being no longer confined to the 
domestic sphere. This change should not be considered as an ethical progress, but 
as a trivial result of the technological changes in communication, and most obvi-
ously to the increasing interdependence which is the main principle of globalisation. 
International action is no longer limited to competition and a gladiator struggle, but 
has more and more to include strategies which go beyond a zero sum game. Crisis 
and conflict are less and less a result of a power competition, but an effect of social 
discrepancies and social pathologies. Power is no more a way of regulation and bal-
18 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures  (New York: Free Press, 1973).
19  James Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics  (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Sidney Tarrow, 
The New Transnational Contention (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
20 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics  (New York: Addison-Wesley, 1979).
21 Steven Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).
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ancing, when this function cannot be effectively achieved by social regulation and 
transnational solidarity.
IR is then attracted by a new agenda which is to be dominated by the ‘tectonic 
aspects of societies’. Social issues, in a global world, are more and more externalised 
and become major international issues, while the economic and social dimensions of 
nation-states are increasingly interdependent. How can we forget that hunger in the 
world results in 2800 deaths every three hours, almost the exact number of casual-
ties caused by the attack on the World Trade Center? How can we ignore the inter-
national consequences of such a drama, even on the social behaviour of those most 
likely to be affected and who compare their plight to that of others throughout the 
world? How can we deny the effect of such social issues on present world conflicts? 
How can we imagine that they do not fuel frustration, humiliation, even life depre-
ciation and create new commitments for radical transnational movements? How can 
we feel reassured by believing that military instruments are able to contain these new 
conflicts?
In the meantime, failures and disasters among the weakest states and their popu-
lations entail potentially grave and costly setbacks for the most powerful ones. En-
vironmental catastrophes in the southern world, health deterioration, particularly the 
AIDS drama, and collapsing states are jeopardising the security of northern coun-
tries. With globalisation, one actor’s failure is likely to threaten its partners’ position. 
Realist egoism is no longer productive, when altruism is getting more and more 
strategic. As a matter of fact, international relations are less exclusively political 
than realists considered them to be, while social and economic dimensions are more 
and more relevant, pushing interdependence to the very centre of the new practices. 
Indeed, ‘politics among nations’ is then becoming ‘the social among nations’. For 
this reason, sociology is ever more relevant in the field, when geopolitics become 
marginal and illusory.
This decreasing relevance of ‘power politics’ entails a loss of meaning in the 
familiar opposition of ‘friend-enemy’. The Cold War period was clearly rooted in 
this opposition as the enemy was then evident and frontal. When it won the Cold 
War, the USA was prompt to look for a new enemy, which it found in China which, 
however, quickly declined this new role. The US then turned to ‘rogue states’, even 
‘terrorist’ groups or networks like Al Qaida. Such an evolution broke up the concept 
of enemy which can hardly be used for describing asymmetric relations, even worse, 
for considering non-state actors, deprived of territories, armies, laws and govern-
ments. As a pivot-concept in realist theory, it implied symmetry, a front, a zero-sum 
game, equivalence and absolute separation. With these fading, it directly questions 
the relevance of classical theory.
This Schmittian concept reflected specific European history, in which the enemy 
shaped international life, but also states and political strategies.22 It even regulated 
the balance of power through which the potential rebirth of the ‘Unique Monarchy’ 
could be prevented. As such, it was the first realist narrative. Now the game is over. 
New actors and partners in the global world are not committed to the same history. 
China never used this way of constructing the enemy. It has now understood very 
promptly that it has no interest to speed up or even entail the collapse of its partners, 
either its main debtor, or all the Western economies upon which it depends. It was 
22 Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).
Bertrand Badie: When History Begins 13
easily convinced that the zero sum game is over. China grasped globalisation earlier 
than all the other partners when it understood that this new context implied revisiting 
the very concept of enemy and to conceive international relations in a much more 
fluid way, in which enmity, indifference and friendship tend to merge.
With globalisation, the more powerful a state, the less it would be rationally in-
clined to play the Schmittian card of enmity, while weak or poor states would have 
good reasons to stay in the classical Schmittian role. It helps them gain diplomatic 
visibility, to consolidate their ability to mobilise and to strengthen their institutions 
and even challenge the great Powers. North Korea, Iran and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq 
play or played this card. But is it still enmity? When opposition is not a structural 
one, when fighting is not balanced, when potential war cannot imply any more a zero 
sum situation? What is true for weak states is even more evident for groups, militias 
or networks. The logic of the state declines to the benefit of the logic of societies. Is 
it meaningful to be the enemy of a society or a part of a society, a religion, or even of 
an interpretation of this religion? If this pivot concept looses a part of its meaning, it 
pulls down with it the concept of military efficiency and alliance. It is then probably 
the beginning of a new history.
THE BEGINNING OF A NEW HISTORY
We are probably at the very beginning of an international history which turns into 
‘intersocial’ history, involving individuals, social actors and social dynamics. Socie-
ties enter the world arena, not as instruments, but as full and effective actors, with 
their culture(s), religion(s), economies and social behaviour. At the negotiating table, 
princes and diplomats had formerly a monopoly of international choice. The practi-
cal issue which is presently at stake is to imagine how to build up an international 
partnership with these new actors; the scientific challenge is to determine how to 
take them into account, as sovereignty-free actors and as power reducers.
In fact, liberalism was supposed to work in that direction. However, by stressing 
the role of markets, it tended in its analysis towards the homo economicus, while 
liberal paradigms could hardly engage with social actors and social structures. Teivo 
Teivanen points out that globalisation gave an impetus to economics and to the tri-
umph of an economic science which is more and more conceived as positive, tech-
nical and neutral at the risk of threatening democratic choice.23 It clearly appeared 
when Papandreou and Berlusconi were brought down and substituted by two tech-
nocrats who were trained by MIT and the Goldman Sachs Bank.
This new vision of economics should be partly considered as an imposture since 
economic science is neither neutral, nor causal, nor prescriptive, while globalisation 
cannot be reduced to economics, even less to markets and still less to liberalism. As 
it should be seen as inclusive and structured by new sophisticated ways of commu-
nication, it has to be considered firstly as a social system.24 Following this trend, IR 
mixes with social relations and goes beyond what the most advanced liberals could 
23  Teivo Teivanen, Enter Economism, Exit politics: Experts, Economic Policy and the Damage to Democracy 
(London: Zed Press, 2002).
24 Jan Aart Scholte, Globalization. A Critical Introduction  (New York: Palgrave, 2000).
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argue. The state is then more than a ‘market state’25 or a ‘competition state’, the main 
function of which would be to improve economic competitiveness.26 In the same 
manner, the international arena cannot be described only through political hegemony 
or economic multipolarity because it also includes expressions of identity (ethnicity, 
religion) articulating resistance, frustration and protests which gain increasing inter-
national relevance, as the Arab Spring shows.  Globalisation creates new insecuri-
ties, arouses new frustrations, reshapes and internationalises social behaviour, causes 
new social inequalities and then new tensions, even a new democratic deficit.27 By 
acquiring an international dimension, all these social facts become major interna-
tional issues, entailing new conflicts and new threats: political and military choices 
are then less relevant than this new ‘social tectonic’ which would explain the ‘AfPak’ 
war in a more convincing manner than classical geopolitics. ‘Terrorist groups’ ap-
pear as new ‘violence entrepreneurs’ who have promptly grasped how they could 
turn this social substratum to their advantage.
IR studies are then reoriented according to five major axes. The first one would 
be to seize the social issues which are presently shaping the international arena, is-
sues which are rarely highlighted by states that marginalise them as ‘development 
issues’, keeping them out the strategic field without taking into account their real 
international relevance. However social issues have an increasing visibility owing 
to the progress of communication and the urbanisation of social pathologies which 
are less and less located in rural zones. Social pathologies are then articulated by 
entrepreneurs of violence in terms of ethnicity or religion and move as such into the 
international arena.
The second axis is shaped by this transformation; social tectonic movements 
gain increasing precedence over interstate conflicts. Even if some of them are still 
active or potential, the major part of world conflicts should be analysed as reflecting 
social tensions: what can state diplomacies efficiently do for solving them? What is 
the relevance of military instruments for containing them? 
The third one points to legitimacy which cannot be exclusively located in terms 
of law and democracy, when it also has to take into account how states are able to 
handle and deal with social mobilisations. As a matter of evidence, new ways of 
legitimisation try to operate by articulating social protest and transferring it into 
the international arena, giving birth to a new kinds of ‘international populisms’, 
of which Indira Gandhi, Gamal Abdel Nasser, and particularly Hugo Chavez were 
among the harbingers. A radical version of this strategy can even lead to violence, as 
can be observed in the AQMI rhetoric.  Repression is then inefficient and even fuels 
the mobilisation of protest. International violence is more social than political in its 
roots – its Clausewitzian nature is clearly questioned.
A fourth axis is constituted by studying the new diplomacy. With the rise of ‘in-
tersocial’ relations, diplomacy cannot keep its original configuration. If diplomacy 
has to manage separateness,28 politics cannot be considered as its exclusive focus, 
while states cannot pretend to be the only diplomatic actors. New diplomacy has to 
follow ‘social routes’, including new paths, new issues and new partners coming 
25 Philip Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History (Knopf: Doubleday, 2003).
26  Philip Cerny, ‘Paradoxes of the Competition State: The Dynamics of Political Globalization’, Government and 
Opposition, Vol. 32, No. 2, (April 1997), pp. 251–274.
27 Jan Aart Scholte, op. cit.
28 Paul Sharp, Diplomatic Theory of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 30.
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particularly from civil societies. Local government, firms, NGOs and the media now 
have a major role to play, leading to a ‘transnational diplomacy’.29
Finally, regulation and governance acquire another meaning thus creating a final 
axis. Regulation was exclusively achieved through state diplomacy and inter-state 
negotiations, in a hegemonic manner or in an oligarchical way which consigned the 
management of the world to the biggest Powers. P5 and G8 are certainly the clear-
est illustration of this messianic delegation. The first option led to the ‘hegemonic 
stability’ thesis30 or to the ‘benign leader’ assertion.31 The second one was invented 
and promoted by middle powers and particularly European ones which expected 
to retain a role in world governance. Both options are in crisis. Hegemony is more 
and more questioned and oligarchy does not lead anymore to decisions, but merely 
tinkers with world order in order to promote its survival. Exclusion weakens and 
jeopardises global stability and does not at all suit new intersocial relations, as it 
did in the context of power politics. As soon as integration becomes a fundamental 
principle, any kind of exclusion becomes dysfunctional and fuels frustration, humili-
ation and violence.
Regulation is possible when social tectonic movements are taken into account. 
The Arab Spring, the Greek crisis in Europe, Palestine, the Sahel, AfPak, all give 
clear evidence of the role played by social dynamics and make interstate regulation 
outdated, while the absence of any kind of well-tested methods of social regulation 
lead all these conflicts into a deadlock. That is certainly why this new history is not 
more peaceful than the previous one. But it is clearly more intense, more universal 
and more human. It is also potentially more participative and less oligarchical. As 
long as it is built on grave social pathologies, it will cause more international vio-
lence. In the previous sequence, societies were set up as states for making war and 
strengthening their own identities. We are now facing the opposite: as social violence 
directly creates a new international violence which grows according to the unpre-
dictability of societies. Instead of being the Hobbesian instrument of a potentially 
permanent war among gladiators, the international system is a possible instrument 
of peaceful regulations. 
This great transformation is presently looking towards new trends in IR theory. 
Historical sociology, constructivism, post-modernism, post-colonialism all open IR 
studies to other disciplines and try to put an end to their ghettoisation. It is in human 
nature to interpret what is unknown through that which is known and indexed. But 
is it right to persist in error, to consider Bin Laden like Brezhnev or the Afghan War 
like the Second World War, to flaunt failure as a false success? Time has come to 
move to an inclusive vision of the new international relations, to make the analysis 
more historical and sociological, in order to begin a new history.
29  Bertrand Badie, “Transnationalizing Diplomacy and Global Governance”, in Pauline Kerr, Geoffrey 
Wiseman,ed., Diplomacy in a Globalizing World, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013 
30 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). 
31 Charles Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929–1939 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973).  
